UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-17-2015

State v. Leary Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43097

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Leary Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43097" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5743.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5743

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 43097

)

v.

)

ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2011-18061

)

DANIEL WILLIAM LEARY,

)

REPLY BRIEF

)

___________
Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY
District Judge

SARA 8. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

-COPY
NOV 17 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... 11
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ........................................................................ 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ........................................................................ 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................... " ............................................ 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 4
The District Court Erred When It Calculated The Credit For Time
Served To Which Mr. Leary Was Entitled......... . ........... .... . ..................... .4
CONCLUSION .. .. . .. ... .... . ..... .. ... . .

.. ...................... 8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ........ ..

. ....................... 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928 (2014) ................................................. 7
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 ( 1983) ........................................................ 7
State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849 (2012) ................................................................6
State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................................ 5, 7
State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895 (Ct. App. 1991 ) .............................................. 7

Statutes
I.C. § 18-309 ..................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 6
I.C. § 19-2063 ................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 6

Rules
I.C.R. 35(c) .......................................................................................................5

Additional Authorities
Ch. 157, § 1, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 473 .................................................. 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Twenty-five-year-old Daniel William Leary pleaded guilty to felony possession of
a controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years,
with two-and-one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

The district court

subsequently suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Leary on probation for a period
of five years.

Mr. Leary later violated his probation, and the district court retained

jurisdiction for a second time and then placed him back on probation. After Mr. Leary
again violated his probation, the district court placed him back on probation, with the
new fundamental condition that Mr. Leary apply for participation in drug court and
successfully complete that program if accepted.

The drug court later ordered that

Mr. Leary be arrested on a drug court bench warrant.
months jail time and was then released

Mr. Leary served over two

He was subsequently arrested on a second

drug court bench warrant, and then on a probation violation bench warrant. The district
court revoked probation and executed the sentence.

However, the district court's

calculation of credit for time served did not give Mr. Leary credit for the time served on
the drug court bench warrants.
Mr. Leary appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it calculated the
credit for time served to which he was entitled. He asserted the 2015 amendments to
Idaho Code §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 (hereinafter, the credit statutes) are retroactive and
require the district court to give Mr. Leary credit for all the time served on the drug court
bench warrants as a condition of his probation.
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In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued Mr. Leary did not show the district
calculation of time served was erroneous based on statutory amendments that
were not effective when the district court made the calculation and that are not
retroactive. (Resp. Br., pp.4-9.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's
contention that the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes are not retroactive.

The

State's retroactivity argument is unavailing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Leary's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
district court err when it calculated the credit for time served

3

which Mr.

ry

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Calculated The Credit For Time Served To Which
Mr. Leary Was Entitled
Mr. Leary asserts that the district court erred when it calculated the credit for time
served to which he was entitled. Mr. Leary requested "all credit for time served on any
warrant that he served on-including that drug court warrant."

(Tr., p.12, Ls.17-1 9.)

The district court's award of credit for 526 days served did not include all the time
Mr. Leary served on the drug court bench warrants as a condition of his probation. 1 As
the State noted (Resp. Br., pp.6-7), the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes,
I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603, were not in effect when the district court calculated the
credit for time served. However, the amendments are retroactive and require the district
court to give Mr. Leary credit for all the time served on the drug court bench warrants as
a condition of probation. Thus, the district court erred when it calculated the credit for
time served to which Mr. Leary was entitled.
The State argues that the language of the amendments shows the Legislature
intended the amendments to apply at the time a district court calculates time served

The State's point that the additional 121 days awarded by the district court was based
on the 121 days served between the November 18, 2014 motion for bench warrant for
probation violation and the March 18, 2015 disposition is well-taken. (See Resp.
Br., p.6 n.2.) Mr. Leary was in custody at the time the motion for bench warrant for
probation violation was filed. (See R., p.187.)
Conversely, the State's contention that Mr. Leary did not request credit for both
drug court warrants is without support in the record. Mr. Leary specifically requested
"all credit for time served on any warrant that he served on-including [the first] drug
court warrant." (Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19.) Just because Mr. Leary highlighted the first drug
court warrant does not negate the fact that he requested "all credit for time served on
any warrant that he served on," i.e., the second drug court warrant as well. Thus,
Mr. Leary would be entitled to the full nine days he served on the second drug
court warrant.
1
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upon imposing judgment. (Resp. Br., p.8.) According to the State, the only time credit
is properly calculated is at the time the judgment is originally entered or ordered into
execution: "the time the statute [I. C. § 18-309] applies is upon entry of judgment after
the probation violation has been found .... Again, the contemplated time-frame for the
awarding of credit for time served [under I.C. § 19-2603] is at the time the court revoked
the probation." (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State's argument is unavailing.
Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that the Idaho Criminal Rules
specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion to correct the calculation of credit
at any time shows that the time the judgment is entered or executed is not the critical
factor in the credit calculation. See !.C.R. 35(c). Rather, as the Idaho Court of Appeals
has recently made clear, "the language of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that,
in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c)
motion for credit for time served, the court give the appropriate credit .... " State v.

Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). "This means that the defendant is entitled
to credit for all time spent incarcerated," as defined by the statute. 2 Id. Thus, the focus
of the credit statutes is not on the judgment itself, but rather, on the person against
whom that judgment was entered. See, e.g., id. If the person is incarcerated in relation
to a judgment, the person is entitled to credit in that judgment.
This conclusion is borne out by the very language of the credit statutes.

For

example, when a district court is granting credit for prejudgment incarceration, "[i]n
computing the time of imprisonment when ... [the] sentence has been suspended and

In Moore, the defendant was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration. Moore, 156
Idaho at 20-21. However, the reasoning of Moore applies equally to all periods of
incarceration identified in the credit statutes.

2
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later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed shall
credit in the judgment .... " LC. § 18-309(2) (emphasis added).

Similarly,

when the district court is reviewing a violation of the terms of probation, "[t]he defendant
shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a condition of probation
under

the

withheld

judgment

or

suspended

sentence."

LC.

§

19-2603

(emphasis added).
The State also incorrectly emphasizes the phrase: "When the court finds that the
defendant has violated the terms of probation . . . . "

(Resp. Br., p.8 (emphasis in

original).) That particular provision of I.C § 19-2603 addresses when the district court
is authorized to revoke probation: "When the court finds that the defendant has violated
the terms and conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation." I.C. § 19-2603.
The provision about when the district court revokes probation does not impact on the
credit calculation, since the credit calculation is addressed in a different part of the
statute. As discussed above, that part of I C. § 19-2603 provides, "[t]he defendant shall
receive credit ... for any time served as a condition of probation under the withheld
judgment or suspended sentence." LC. § 19-2603.
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849 (2012),
further disproves the State's reading of the 2015 amendments. The relevant language
in the sex offender registration statute amendment in Forbes provided: "A judgment of
conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in
section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to dismissal or reduction under this
section." Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851 (quoting Ch. 157, § 1, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 473,
473) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Forbes Court observed that, "[a]ccording
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to the amendment, a conviction means that 'the person has pied guilty or has been
found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment."' Id. The
Court therefore held "the amendment clearly applies to [the defendant], who was
subject to a withheld judgment after he pleaded guilty to an offense requiring sex
offender registration." Id. The Forbes Court focused on the defendant as a person who
had been convicted of an offense requiring sex offender registration, not on the time the
withheld judgment was entered. See id. Similarly, the focus of the amendments here is
on the person who is entitled to credit, not on the time the judgment is entered.
The final point against the State's argument is that this Court, like the district
court in Moore, is obligated to ensure the defendant is receiving "credit for the correct
amount of time actually served . . . The [courts do] not have discretion to award credit
for time served that is either more or less than that." See Moore, 156 Idaho at 21 (citing
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455, 456-57 (1983); State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895,

897 (Ct. App. 1991 )) (emphasis added)

Therefore, the State's argument-which is

essentially that this Court should affirm an improper calculation of credit because of the
time at which the judgment was entered or executed-is unavailing.
Because the State's argument is unavailing, it is necessary to return to the plain
language of the credit statutes to determine if the 2015 amendments have retroactive
effect. See, e.g., Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937 (2014). As discussed in the
Appellant's Brief, the amendments, by referring to past and future periods of
incarceration served as a condition of release on probation (i.e., "any period of
incarceration"), are retroactive by their plain language. (App. Br., pp.9-14.)
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Because the Legislature made the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes
retroactive in scope, they control in Mr. Leary's case. The district court erred when it
calculated the credit for time served to which Mr. Leary was entitled, because it did not
give him credit for all the time served on the drug court bench warrants as a condition
of probation.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Leary
respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's calculation of credit for time
served, vacate the district court's Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence
with respect to the calculation of credit for time served, and remand this case for entry
of an order for all the credit to which Mr. Leary is entitled.
DATED this 17th day of November, 2015.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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